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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH

LUDEAN H. COX,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
EDWARD C. CARLISLE, Mayor of
Manti City, MANTI CITY, a municipal corporation, HENRY HENNINGSON, JOHN McINTOSH
and ED NIELSON,

) Z ^ ° '
;

J

Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Divorced from emotive statements about falling fences,
neat furrows, equipment invasions, and "extraordinary circumstances," the present case is concerned with the question of
whether a person can acquire public property merely by claiming
ownership.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Defendants-respondents—hereinafter called "defendants"
—agree with the plaintiff's statement of facts insofar as it
repeats occurrences at the trial; however, defendants do not
agree with the conclusions drawn from some of the recited
testimony. The chosen excerpts do not give an accurate picture
of the total impression which must have been given to the
trial judge. Moreover, with respect to the question of occupancy, the plaintiff was stingy in her references to documentary
evidence in itself sufficient to sustain the findings of fact.
Manti City was incorporated in 1851. In 1872 the property
upon which the townsite was located was conveyed to Luther
T. Tuttle, then mayor of Manti, by patent from the United
States of America (Ex. 7), pursuant to an act of Congress of
March 2, 1867, generally referred to as the Townsite Act (14
Stat. 541; 43 U.S.C § 718).
No direct evidence was introduced at the trial as to the
date upon which the townsite was entered. However, the trial
judge, with plaintiff's acquiescence, requested defendants'
counsel to find out when the entry was made and whether a
plat was entered along with it, and to let the court know (R.
173; Unpaged minute entry of June 15, 1959). The Director
of the Bureau of Land Management of the United States Department of the Interior wrote to counsel that Cash Certificate
No. 636 was issued to Mayor Tuttle on May 15, 1871. Copies
of the letter were furnished to the court and plaintiff's counsel,
and it is reprinted herein as Appendix A. The letter indicates
that no declaratory statement was filed and that a cash entry
was made.
Mayor Tuttle deeded Parcel 99 to William Bench under
2
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date of December 14, 1871, and Parcel 113 to William A. Cox
under date of December 21, 1871. Both deeds described the
property by reference to "Plat A of Manti City Survey." The
deed to Parcel 99 (Ex. 6) described the land as being "35 rods
north and south by 46 rods east and west containing ten acres",
and the deed to Parcel 113 (Ex. 8) described the land as "being
46 rods east and wrest by 6 rods north and south containing
one 106/160 acres." These descriptions are in conformance
with the official plat (Ex. 5) and are accurate only if there is
a 66-foot strip between Parcels 99 and 113.
One of the documents introduced in evidence by the
plaintiff was an abstract of title (Ex. l ) . It shows that Parcels
99 and 113, beginning with the 1871 conveyance by Mayor
Tuttle, were always described in such a way that a strip of
land 66 feet wide kept them apart—even after both parcels
came into common ownership. There has never been a conveyance in which anyone claimed to be the owner of the 66-foot
wide strip (or street) between Parcels 99 and 113.
Although these deeds from the mayor to the original occupants do not conclude plaintiff, as res judicata, from now
claiming that her predecessors were the occupants of the street
at the time of the entry, the deeds constitute evidence that the
grantees were not in possession of the street at the time of the
entry. Other documents enhance the value of the deeds for this
purpose. The official record of the declaratory statements made
by claimants at the time of the land adjudications, and the
official record of the adjudications were introduced in evidence
as defendants' Exhibits 10 and 9, respectively.
The record of declaratory statements, Page 181, Entry
3
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59 (Ex. 10), shows the claim of William Bench to Parcel 99
"containing 10 acres." The adjudication record (Ex. 9), Page
132, Entry 59, shows William Bench to have appeared in court
and "claimed to be the rightful owner of possession of land
as set forth in statement, to wit, * * * Parcel 99 being 35
rods north and south by 46 rods east and west containing 10
acres." In the same book, Page 156, Entry 166, William A.
Cox is shown to have appeared in court and claimed to be the
rightful owner of possession of various parcels of land, among
which was Parcel No. 113 "being 46 rods east and west by
6 rods north and south, containing one and Il6/l60th acres."
No claim was made by either Mr. Bench or Mr. Cox to the
property in the platted street lying between Parcels 99 and 113.
Exhibit 5, sheets A through D, introduced by the defendants, is the official Manti plat and map. It shows Parcel 99
to contain 10 acres, to be 35 rods north and south by 46 rods
east and west and to be separated by a street between it and
Parcel 113. Parcel 113 is shown on the map to be 6 rods north
and south by 46 rods east and west and to contain one and
Il6/l60ths acres. The plat was adopted as the official Manti
City plat on January 25, 1892, and was filed for record on
January 29, 1892. The drawing contains the following certificate:
"I hereby certify that this is a correct Map of a
survey made by me in the month of February, 1871.
E. W. Fox
County Surveyor"
These documents constitute the only direct evidence as
to occupancy of the 66-foot street at the time of entry in the
Utah land office by Mayor Tuttle. Both sides introduced
.4
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testimony of inhabitants of the area—plaintiff's witnesses saying there was no street, and defendants' that there was, at
various times in years gone by. The testimony referred to known
landmarks, and from the testimony as a whole the court could
justifiably conclude that there was a street used by the inhabitants of Manti some time after the entry. While the excerpts
quoted by the plaintiff in her brief might raise some question
as to the parcels that were being talked about by the witnesses,
the entire testimony has to be read, and the plaintiff cannot
successfully attack the testimony by slighting references to
small portions. The evidence shows that there was a street.
One witness called by the plaintiff, H. R. Clark, testified,
in effect, that there was a road running west to the Cox property
line where it ended abruptly, somewhat like an aircraft runway
(R. 109). This type of street taxes the imagination.
Mr. William Terry Hall testified that there was a road
separating Parcels 113 and 99, that he used it to haul hay, that
the use was made without asking anyone for the privilege, that
no one ever tried to stop him, and that he understood, from
what his father told him that there was a platted road through
that area (R. 59, 60, 62, 64 and 67).
One of plaintiff's witnesses, Fred W. Cox, testified that
the lane ran between Parcels 99 and 113, that it was traveled
some, but that it was never fenced, "only on one side, over in
on Parcel 113" (R. 135).
In March, 1910, property owners within a section of Manti
City petitioned the District Court of the Seventh Judicial
District for disconnection of certain territory from the City of
5
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Manti (Ex. 2). The action was initiated pursuant to § 288
et seq., Compiled Laws of 1907, which is substantially the
same as the present Chapter 4, Title 10, Utah Code Annotated
1953.
The prayer of the petition was that:
* * * t ^ c i e r k 0 f said court cause notice to be
given of the filing and purpose of this petition in the
manner provided by law and that after the hearing
hereon and the proceedings had in conformity with
the requirements of the statute in such case made and
provided, that the court make a decree disconnecting
and detaching the said described propery from said
Manti City."
The City of Manti was served with summons but did
not answer the petition, and on April 4, 1910, the city's default
was entered.
Other evidence related to the Cox farm and what the
plaintiff and her husband, Grant Cox, had done with it. Plaintiff
testified that she was born in 1912, could remember back as
far back as 1919, but to her recollection there was never a road
between Parcels 99 and 113 (R. 88). She agreed with her
counsel that the premises had been improved "by leveling and
placing fertilizer on them" (R. 94).
Grant Cox, the plaintiff's husband, was also her witness.
He testified that he and his wife had occupied the property
since about 1948 or 1949. They had improved the lands by
changing the irrigation system; equipping a well with a pump;
constructing a pond; and putting in cement ditches, risers and
headgates. Since 1948 they had spent in the neighborhood of
$15,000.00 on the land (R. 114). But this amount was spent
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on the entire 80 acres owned by the Coxes, not on the 11 and
H6/l60ths acres included in Parcels 99 and 113, and certainly not on the 66-foot by 759-foot Manti City street. Mr.
Cox testified that six or seven years before the trial he had
been told by one of the city councilmen that the city intended
to build a road between Parcels 113 and 99 (R. 117), that in
January of 1959 he noted that the defendants had knocked
down his fence and had run a grader through some alfalfa
and had filled in a ditch (R. 118). He said the placing of a
road would affect the leveling of the ground and that it would
have to be re-leveled (R. 118), but that he could not estimate
the amount of damage he had suffered because of the destroyed
fences, the damaged ditches and the cut into the drain (R.
120). It would take $10 or $15 to repair the fence (R. 120),
half a day to fill up the hole that had been dug through the
field (R. 121) and about $10 to clean out the ditches.
On cross examination Mr. Cox testified that the $15,000.00
he was talking about was the cost of improving approximately
80 acres in the vicinity. Mr. Cox also testified that the land was
re-leveled in 1955 (R. 126) which, according to his own testimony, would have been sometime after the city first put him
on notice of its claim to the road (R. 117). He also testified
that the pond and the pipe, the cement pipe and the cement
ditches were put in after the city had told him that they
wanted to build a road between Parcels 99 and 113 (R. 126).
But he was not very clear as to just what effect the roadway
would have on his irrigation system (R. 127). While he
thought that putting in a road would "cut the value down
quite a bit," there was no testimony by him or by any appraiser
as to how much it would cut it down (R. 128).
7
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
1. The evidence supports the court's finding that a 66-foot
street existed between Parcels 99 and 113 at the time of the
entry of Mayor Tuttle under the Townsite Act.
2. The evidence supports the trial court's finding that
there was no abandonment or vacation of the street.
3. The evidence supports the court's finding that the
defendants are not estopped from claiming title to and opening
the street.

ARGUMENT
I.
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE COURT'S FINDING
THAT A 66-FOOT STREET EXISTED BETWEEN
PARCELS 99 AND 113 AT THE TIME OF THE ENTRY OF
MAYOR TUTTLE UNDER THE TOWNSITE ACT.
Plaintiff and defendants seem to agree that the Utah law
relating to rights of occupants under the Townsite Act of 1867
is set out in Hall et al. v. North Ogden City et al., 109 Utah
325, 175 P.2d 703 (1946). There it was held that a conveyance
by the probate judge, acting as trustee, to a city or town in
contravention of the rights of the occupant as of the date of
the entry, was void. The case also held that although a claimant
had presented a claim for and participated in an adjudication
as to certain properties, this was not res judicata as to adjacent
land claimed by the city to have been dedicated as public streets.
8
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In the Hall case, however, it was stipulated that, except
for one small tract, none of the lands had ever been opened
up or used as streets by the public, and the only evidence,
apparently, as to that tract, was that it had never been opened
up as a street. The plaintiff here doesn't have such a stipulation or such proof. On the other hand, there is enough
evidence against her to support—even require—a finding that
the plaintiff and her predecessors were not in occupancy of
the disputed strip at the time of entry under the Townsite Act.
First, there is the official plat of Manti City as introduced
in evidence at the trial (Defendants' Exhibit 5). This map
shows a 66-foot street between Parcels 99 and 113. There is
a certificate on the exhibit that it is a correct map of a survey
made by the County Surveyor in February, 1871, about three
months prior to the entry. At the trial, this map was the most
reliable probative evidence of the existence of streets and the
occupancy of lands in Manti City at the time of the entry.
It has been held, in a case decided under the Townsite
Act, that such a map in prima facie evidence of the facts shown
in it. In Placer County et al. v. Lake Tahoe Ry. and Transportation et al, 58 Cal. App. 764, 209 Pac. 900 (1922), there
was a dispute as to whether lands platted as a public common
had been occupied at the time of the entry. The court said:
"In the first place, it is to be observed that a map
made in 1863 was introduced in evidence and thereon
Block 6 was marked and designated as public common
and the Bethel map, as seen, corresponds in that particular with said map of 1863. We refer to the last
mentioned map because it is stated by counsel for the
defendants that there is no evidence to show that
9
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prior to the survey of the townsite made by Bethel in
1871 Block 6 constituted a public common and because,
also, they contend that the mere fact that Bethel
marked and designated Block 6 on his map as public
common is not evidence that the block was previously
regarded as public common. Now, as to the Bethel
map on which the whole of Block 6 is marked designated as public common, said map having been made
by and under the authority of the act of the legislature
of 1867 and 1868, supra, constitute, by virtue of the
provisions of section 3 of said act, 'prima facie evidence of the content and correctness thereof in all the
courts of this state.' Hence the burden was upon the
defendant mercantile company to overthrow or overcome, by competent evidence, the fixed probative effect
imparted by the law to said map and the field notes
made at the same time. This burden the mercantile
company failed to sustain."
Utah, too, has a statute which makes the surveyor's map
of 1871 prima facie evidence of its contents. It is provided
in 78-25-3 Utah Code Annotated 1953:
"Entries in public or other official books or records,
made in the performance of his duty by a public officer
of this state or by any other person in the performance
of a duty specially enjoined by the law, are prima
facie evidence of the facts stated therein."
It was the County Surveyor's duty to make surveys and record
them. See Territory of Utah, Compiled Latvs of 1876, §§ 226235.
Apart from statute, however, the 1871 map—the authenticity of which has not been challenged, and which was
recognized by the Manti City council in adopting the map as
the official plat of Manti City in 1892—is competent evidence
10
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of the facts shown on the map, according to the overwhelming
weight of authority, ancient and modern.
The general rule is stated in an annotation, "Admissibility
in evidence of ancient maps and the like/' 46 A.L.R. 2d 1318,
1320:
"An exception to the general rule which requires
maps, surveys, and the like, to be authenticated by the
testimony of the party making the same exists where
the documents are ancient. Maps, surveys, etc., purporting to be thirty years old or more are said to prove
themselves and are admissible in evidence without the
ordinary requirements as to the proof of execution or
handwriting if relevant to the inquiry, when produced
from proper custody, on their face free from suspicion,
and authorized or recognized as official documents/'
The plat and map of Manti City, prepared in February,
1871, by E. W. Fox, County Surveyor, meets the requirements
set out in the reported cases. The map, therefore, is evidence
that there was a 66-foot street between Parcels 99 and 113
at the time of the entry by Mayor Luther T. Tuttle.
And the map isn't the only evidence. The conduct of
plaintiff's predecessors would lead one to believe that there
was a street separating Parcel 99 from 113. As pointed out
in the Statement of Facts, William Bench in his declaratory
statement, and both William Bench and William H. Cox in
the land adjudication proceedings, described their property
in the same way as it was shown on the map: same dimensions,
same acreage. Neither Mr. Cox nor Mr. Bench said anything
to the court about being entitled to the possession of the
66-foot strip between Parcels 99 and 113, nor to any part
of it. A fact finder would have to leave the realm of reality to
11
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avoid reaching the conclusion that the strip wasn't claimed
because the claimants knew it was a city street.
To overcome this evidence of the County Surveyor, the
council of Manti City (which adopted the plat as official),
and the declaratory statement and the statements before the
probate court, the plaintiff has introduced not a trace of
evidence relating to occupancy of the street at the time of entry.
There was some testimony by plainiff's witnesses, it is
true, to the effect that there never was a street between Parcels
99 and 113. But their memories didn't go back beyond the
1890's, and some of the testimony doesn't appear to have any
probative value. For instance, Mrs. Cox, the plaintiff, couldn't
remember past 1918—some 47 years after the entry. Even if
testimony about the conditions in 1892 were relevant to prove
conditions in 1871, nevertheless the defendants introduced
testimony from disinterested witnesses to the effect that there
was a street (admittedly not paved, curbed and guttered as
are modern streets in modern cities) for a long time after
1871. Could this court, on that state of the evidence, direct
a trial court to find that there was no street between Parcels
99 and 113 at the time of entry; and, beyond that, to find
that plaintiff's predecessors occupied the strip?

THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE TRIAL COURT'S
FINDING THAT THERE WAS NO ABANDONMENT OR
VACATION OF THE STREET.
12
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Under the present Utah statute, cities and towns may
vacate public streets only by ordinance (10-8-8 Utah Code
Annotated 1953). The requirement that the vacation of streets
by a city be done by ordinace first came into Utah law by
Chapter 123, Laws of Utah, 1917, § 206 x 8. Prior to that
time the statute had provided only that cities and towns might
vacate streets, without specifying the method.
Inasmuch as there is no evidence that any ordinance was
ever adopted or other official action taken, to vacate the street
in question, plaintiff must rely upon some act of the city in
carrying out an intention to abandon the street, and this prior
to adoption of the 1917 amendment.
Plaintiff apparently seeks to become owner of a city street
by virtue of the 1910 disconnection proceeding, though her
theory is not clear to defendants since the 1910 decree did
nothing more than remove a large parcel of property from
Manti City. The street was "disconnected" from Manti—but
it continued to connect two sides of Manti. The southern
boundary of the disconnected portion was not a straight line,
and Manti's northern boundary after the disconnectoin looked
something like this:

B

The street connects sides A and B. (See Exhibits 2 and 5).
Even if the court should conclude that the city has no
power to open or maintain a street outside the city limits, this
13
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would still not help the plaintiff. The most that would happen
would be that the street as street might go to Sanpete County,
while the strip as real property would remain in Manti City.
In Odom v. Wood, 111 S.W. 2d 165 (Mo. App. 1944) it
was held that upon separation of lands from a city the right
to streets within the separated area vested in the county. And
in Knight v. Thomas, 35 Utah 470, 101 Pac. 383 (1909) this
court held that upon vacation of a street the right to occupy
and use the land is in the owner of the fee. The court said:
"If all the interest which the city had in and to the
land was only with respect to the public way on the
land, then on vacation of the street, all its interest in
and to the land ceased. * * * When the street is
vacated, the right to occupy and use the land belongs
to him in whom the fee is—the city, or the original
landowner if it was reserved by him and not conveyed,
or to the abutting property owners—and the land is
subject to all the use and enjoyment and burdens of
other lands; and // the fee is in the city the land is }ust
as much real property as is other lands owned by the
city." (Emphasis added.)
Moreover, there is no evidence that an ordinance was
adopted by Sanpete County abandoning or vacating the street,
if it should be assumed that Sanpete County, after the disconnection, was the proper public body to do it. Prior to 1911
the statute regulating the power of counties to abandon highways provided as follows:
"All highways once established must continue to be
highways until abandoned by order of the Board of
County Commissioners of the county in which they
are situated, by operation of law; or by judgment of
a court of competent jurisdiction; provided, that a road
14
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not used or worked for a period of five years ceases
to be a highway." Compiled Laws of Utah, 1907, §
1116.
In 1911 ,the year after the disconnection proceeding, the
statute was amended by Chapter 142, Laws of Utah, 1911, to
read as follows:
"All highways once established must continue to be
highways until abandoned by order of the Board of
County Commissioners of the county in which they
are situated, or by judgment of a court of competent
jurisdiction.'' (Cf. 27-1-3 Uth Code Annotated 1953.)
To prove abandonment or vacation of the street the
plaintiff must prove some affirmative act on the part of the
city or the county indicating an intention to abandon. If she
relies upon the action of the county, it must be upon some
unofficial act or non-user for a five-year period prior to 1911.
This she cannot do, since the county did not become involved
until after the 1910 disconnection. There has been no statute
providing that city streets may be abandoned by non-user for
five or any other number of years.
The question of what is necessary to constitute abandonment of the street by a city was considered in Tooele City v.
Elkington et al, 100 Utah 485, 116 P.2d 406 (1941). This
court distinguished earlier cases between strictly private parties,
where conduct of the city had been a factor and seemed to
indicate that a good deal more than non-user would be required
if an adverse title were asserted against a city itself.
In the present case plaintiff must rely solely upon the fact
that for a number of years the city did not improve and
maintain the public street. Moreover, this would have to have
15
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been for a number of years prior to 1917, because since then
cities have not been able to abandon or vacate a street by any
other methon than by ordinance. (See 10-8-8 U.C.A. 1953,
and its history in Tooele City v. Elkington, supra).
To establish abandonment of the street, the plaintiff must
show not only non-user but an intention to abandon. It has
been stated that non-user is only an evidentiary fact aiding in
the resolution of the question of intention. It has also been
held that non-use, coupled with failure to remove obstructions
erected by abutting owners and others has been held not to
amount to abandonment and that an intention to abandon
is not established by negative or equivocal acts. 11 McQuillan
on Municipal Corporations (3d Ed.) § 30.182; 1 Antieau on
Municipal Corporation Law 580.
Although the statutes prior to 1917 did not prescribe the
method by which a street would have to be vacated by a city,
"vacation" is an "affirmative act." 11 McQuillan on Municipal
Corporations (3d Ed.), supra; it ordinarily describes "termination of the existence of a highway by direct action of the
public authorities." Bond v. Green et al., 189 Va. 23, 52 S.E.
2d 169, 172. There is no evidence that anything was done
by Manti City or Sanpete County to vacate the street. The
plat and the abstracts, as well as the property descriptions
in all conveyances, showed the street, and all conveyances
of property were made with relation to it. Accordingly, it
would seem that there was no vacation, that the street continued in existence, and that the city owned the fee, unless
the city is estopped from claiming title to the strip and the
right to open the street.
16
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Although this court has not set out just what is necessary
for a city to do to abandon a street, it has recognized that
different rules govern the abandonment or vacation of city
streets than the abandonment of highways by a county. In
Sowadzki v. Salt Lake County, 36 Utah 127, 104 Pac. I l l ,
115 (1909), decided during the period when a county could
abandon roads by five-years' non-use, the court said:
* * * the legislature has always treated streets
as being controlled by different provisions than those
which affect county highways. In view of these provisions, and others which require no special mention,
we are of the opinion that the legislature intended the
streets in cities and towns should be governed by a
different rule with regard to the abandonment thereof
than are roads and highways in the county outside
of such cities and towns. The reason for such distinction is clearly pointed out by some of the authorities
heretofore cited as well as in those hereafter noticed.
But independently of such reasons, if the legislature
has made such a difference (and we think it has), then
it becomes our duty to enforce it."
III.
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE COURT'S FINDING
THAT THE DEFENDANTS ARE NOT ESTOPPED FROM
CLAIMING TITLE TO AND OPENING THE STREET.
The plaintiff's most fervent argument is based upon what
she calls "extraordinary circumstances" which should estop
the city from opening the street. She relies upon the decision
of this court in Wall v. Salt Lake City, 50 Utah 593, 168 Pac.
766, (1917), seeing in the instant case "extraordinary circumstances" like those in Wall. We don't agree.
17
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In Wall v. Salt Lake City, supra, there was affirmative
misleading conduct, the city having actively led the plaintiff
or her predecessors to expend money in subdividing and selling
the lots, and to advance money on security of a mortgage. This
had been done after several contacts had been made with the
city and the city had approved a subdivision the existence of
which was inconsistent with the location of a street thereafter
claimed by the city. In Wall v. Salt Lake City, supra, the court
correctly held that the defendants were estopped from claiming
the street.
There were extraordinary factors present in that case:
active misleading by the city; expenditure of large sums of
money in reliance upon the city's action; taxation of the
property in question to the land owners over a number of years;
and collection and use of the taxes by the city.
In the present case those factors are absent. We have,
at most, non-action by the city with respect to maintaining
the street between Parcels 99 and 113. In addition, the evidence
as to improvements is of an equivocal character; there is no
evidence of substantial monetary loss to the defendants; there
is evidence that many of the improvements relied upon by
the plaintiff as a basis for estoppel were made after the city
had given notice of its intention to re-open the street; in
continued transfers of the property plaintiff's predecessors
have recognized the existence of the street; no one in the
chain of title has paid taxes on the property or sought to have
it assessed; and they have had the benefits of possession and
use without paying rent.
Plaintiff's case is weaker than the one held by this court
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in Tooele City v. Elkington, supra, 100 Utah 485, 116 P.2d
406 (1941), to be insufficient to raise an estoppel. There the
court said:
"In the case at bar, the consideration given the city
by Elkington was small, if anything; the deed was made
in contravention of the statute; there is no evidence that
the property had been assessed against the defendants
or their predecessor's interests; the time element is
short; and there was not a replatting or a change in
the whole neighborhood to the benefit of all adjacent
landowners."
Moreover, in the Elkington case, the defendants relied
on an estoppel created by the actual giving of a deed by the
City of Tooele. The only stronger element here, from plaintiff's
standpoint, is that the non-user was for a longer period. But
non-user, no matter how long continued, is usually held not
to be a sufficient ground for raising an estoppel to prevent a
city from opening a city street.
Even the annotations cited by plaintiff in her brief preponderantly support the proposition that the mere fact that
the municipality has permitted a platted street or alley to
remain unopened over a long period of years will not estop
it from opening such street or alley. And those cases holding
that non-user or inaction on the part of the city may be sufficient to raise an estoppel, also require a finding that failure
to raise the estoppel would result in great damage to the
persons in possession (171 A.L.R. 110).
A thread running throughout the estoppel cases is the
idea that it would be grossly unfair to permit the city to
change its position. Courts will not permit such a change if
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great damage would result to the other party and that the
public interests are outweighed by this great damage. In the
present case plaintiff's evidence was skimpy at best as to just
what effect the street would have upon her ability to farm,
and to utilize the irrigation system, the pond, the concrete
pipes and what-have-you. She failed to differentiate between
the portion of her $15,000 spent upon the 80-acre tract and
the portion spent on the city's 66 by 759-foot strip. She failed
to differentiate between the amounts spent before and the
amounts spent after the city notified Mr. Cox of its intention
to open the street.
We are confident that if this court were sitting as the
trier of fact it would not, under those circumstances, raise an
estoppel against defendants. But this court is not sitting as
the trier of fact. To reverse the trial judge this court must
not only regard the facts as sufficient for an estoppel, but
hold that on such evidence it is mandatory that a trial court
find "extraordinary circumstances" and give the public's
property to private parties without compensation. The plaintiff's evidence just isn't that good or that much. It's equivocal,
thin, and unconvincing.
The only thing left upon which plaintiff can rely is the
1910 disconnection proceeding. And she seems to contend
that the defendants are bound not only by the judgment but
by the statements in the petition. This is not the law. Although
summons was served upon the defendant Manti City, it did
not answer and default was entered against it. Thereafter the
proceeding went ahead, apparently without the participation
of the city, and certainly without litigation of any of the facts
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upon which the judgment was based. The prayer was only
that the property be disconnected from the city, and the judgment did not and could not go beyond the prayer of the
complaint. Section 3187 of the Compiled Laws of 1907 (in
effect at the time of the proceeding) provided:
'The relief granted to the plaintiff, if there be no
answer, cannot exceed that which he shall have demanded in his complaint; * * *
Plaintiff seems to argue in her brief that the disconnection
proceeding somehow had the effect of depriving the city of
title to a street—a fee title it had received by patent from the
United States to the Mayor of Manti City in 1872. She would
have judgment go far beyond that prayed in the complaint,
solely on the basis of some statements in the petition, one
of the signers of which was interested only in escaping a tax
burden (R. 146).
The judgment cannot have any effect as res judicata on
the question of the ownership of the street by the city. As
stated in the Resetatement of Judgments, § 68(2):
"A judgment on one cause of action is not conclusive in asubsequent action on a different cause of
action as to questions of fact nor actually litigated and
determined in the first action."
The reasons for the rule are set out in Comment D to
§ 68, in part as follows:
" * * * The result is different, however, as to the
effect of the judgment upon other causes of action. The
defendant is not precluded from interposing a defense
to the subsequent action which he might have interposed but did not interpose in the first action.
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"Although it is not unfair to the losing party to hold
that any question of fact actually determined in the
action shall be conclusive against him in a subsequent
action between the parties based upon a different cause
of action, it would be unfair to him to hold that he
is precluded from relying upon facts which might
have been but were not determined in the prior action.
If the defendant fails to interpose a defense in the
prior action and judgment is given against him, the
original cause of action is merged in the judgment;
but there is no reason why he should not make the
defense when sued upon a different cause of action.
He may have various reasons for not interposing the
defense in the first action and for permitting the
plaintiff to obtain a judgment against him in that action.
It may be that the action involves so small an amount
that a defense to the action would cost him more than
he would lose by failing to defend. * * * It would be
most unjust to him to hold that his failure to defend
should have the same result as though he had interposed a defense and it was found that the matters
alleged in the defense were untrue."
The only purpose of the disconnection proceeding, as can
be seen from a reading of the statute and the authorities,
as well as a Utah case considering disconnection, is a political
one to determine city boundaries for purposes of taxation
and mutual obligations and rights as between the governing
body and its citizens. It was never intended, and there is nothing
in the statute that indicates that it was, to be a means of
depriving a city of property it owns. Cf. Title 10, Chapter 4,
Utah Code Annotated 1953 (substantially the same as §§
288 et seq. of Compiled Laws of 1907); Plutus Mining Company v. Orme, 76 Utah 286, 289 Pac. 132 (1930); 1 Antieau
on Municipal Corporation Law, § 1.24.
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(If plaintiff argues that the city has no power to maintain
streets outside the city limits, the answer is that the question
of ' 'power"—apart from ownership of the street—is no concern
of hers. It is a question between the city and its taxpayers.)
Taken all in all, then, the claim of estoppel as raised
by the plaintiff in the above case is based solely upon inaction
(one type of which was failure to oppose disconnection) by
the city over a number of years, but without proof of any
particular reliance by the plaintiff, without proof of any expenditure, in general, without proof of any extraordinary circumstances, but with proof that the plaintiff and her predecessors
have taken advantage of the fact that taxes were not being
assessed against the property. The plaintiff's circumstances are
ordinary, not extraordinary.

CONCLUSION
The evidence clearly establishes that there was a city
street between Parcels 99 and 113 at the time of the entry
by Mayor Luther T. Tuttle under the Townsite Act. This is
shown by an official map made at approximately the time
of the entry, certified by the County Surveyor, and by the
declaratory statements and adjudications of the claimants to
the property.
Plaintiff has failed to prove facts sufficient to raise an
estoppel against the city. While there may have been non-use
of the street over a period of years, non-use isn't enough; and
there has not been reliance and expenditure by the plaintiff
such as to justify application of the doctrine of estoppel.
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There is no evidence that the city took any action at any
time that would constitute abandonment or vacation of the
street between Parcels 99 and 113.
The disconnection proceeding filed in 1910 has no further
effect that to change the political boundaries of Manti City.
Even if it were held that jurisdiction over the streets was
affected by the proceeding, the result would be to put the street
as a street under the county's control—but it would have no
effect on the street as property. [The plaintiff has not shown
herself to be a proper party to contest the city's right to spend
tax money on a street it owns outside the political boundaries
of the city.]
The plaintiff's claim of estoppel is not well-founded, since
she has failed to show that the city ever did anything except
fail to take affirmative action to maintain the street and
failed to make an appearance in an action in which certain
taxpayers wanted to get out of the city. Under the cases this
is not sufficient to raise an estoppel against the city, particularly
where the property owner has not relied upon the inaction to
his substantial detriment. The plaintiff failed to make the kind
of proof that would support estoppel in any kind of case, let
alone one in which the rights of the public in the city streets
is concerned. Failure to estop the city won't lead to any injustice—gross or otherwise.
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The Findings of Fact of the trial court are supported by
ample evidence, the Conclusions of Law are correct, and the
judgment should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
Dilworth Woolley
Manti, Utah
Bryce E. Roe
FABIAN & CLENDENIN
800 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City 1, Utah
Attorneys for Respondents
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APPENDIX A
UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT
Washington 25, D. C.
July 2, 1959
Mr. Bryce E. Roe * * *

.

Dear Mr. Roe:
In response to your letter of June 18 we have checked
our records concerning the entry for Manti Town Site, Utah.
We find that Luther T. Tuttle, Mayor of Manti, purchased
at the Land Office at Salt Lake City, Utah, on May 15, 1871,
the SV2 sec. 1, EVySfE^, NE1/4SE1/4 sec. 11, all sec. 12, T. 18 S.,
R. 2 E., and lots 1, 2, 3, 4 sec. 7, and lot 7 sec. 6, T. 18 S.,R. 3 E.,
Salt Lake Meridian, Utah. Full payment for the land was made
in the amount of $1600, being at the rate of $1.25 an acre for
the 1280 acres purchased.
Cash Certificate No. 636, Salt Lake City, issued to Mayor
Tuttle on May 15, 1871, the date he purchased the land, followed by the patent which issued to him, in trust for the
inhabitants of Manti, on September 2, 1872. This patent is
recorded in our patent record volume 2, page 162. A certified
photostatic copy thereof may be obtained for $1. You may also
obtain a similar copy of the cash certificate and the cash receipt
for $1 each. Your remittance for this purpose should be by
check or postal money order made payable to the Bureau of
Land Management.
Our records disclose no other papers, nor any plat of the
town site. Such plats were usually filed with the county recorder's office of the county where the town site was located.
Sincerely yours,
For the Director:
/ s / S. C. Nichols
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